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Abstract
Fully homomorphic encryption is a kind of encryption scheme, which en-
ables arbitrary computation on encrypted data without accessing the data.
We present the quantum version of fully homomorphic encryption scheme,
which is constructed based on quantum fault-tolerant construction. Two
schemes are constructed. The first is a symmetric scheme, and the secret
key is the quantum CSS code. In the scheme, when Server performs quan-
tum computation on the encrypted plaintext, some ancillary quantum states
should be provided by Client. The second is an asymmetric scheme, which
contains the periodical interaction between Client and Server.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, fully homomorphic encryption,
quantum CSS codes, fault-tolerant quantum computation
1. Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a kind of encryption scheme
with the homomorphic property. It enables arbitrary computation on en-
crypted plaintext, without decrypting them. FHE is fundamental in the
theory and application of cryptology, such as secure multiparty computa-
tion, zero-knowledge proof, search encrypted data, outsourcing computing,
copyright protection. For many years, the researchers yearn for a construc-
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tion of FHE scheme. Since Gentry [1] sucessfully devised a FHE scheme,
FHE becomes an important research direction in cryptology.
Quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) [2] represents a quan-
tum version of FHE. Generally, QFHE is a kind of FHE scheme which is
realized through quantum computing technology. Similar with the classical
FHE, a QFHE has four algorithms: key generation algorithm, encryption al-
gorithm, decryption algorithm, evaluation algorithm. The difference between
QFHE and FHE is the computing model. FHE is established under the model
of polynomial-time probabilistic computation, while QFHE is defined by the
model of polynomial-time quantum computation.
In 2012, Rohde et al.[3] proposed a symmetric quantum homomorphic
encryption scheme, which permits quantum random walk on encrypted quan-
tum data. However, it is not fully homomorphic. Later, in Ref.[2], QFHE is
formalized, and a weak symmetric scheme is constructed. By the scheme, the
encrypted quantum data can be directly used in the quantum computation,
without decrypting them in advance. However, the scheme is different from
the commonly mentioned FHE, since the secret key is necessary during the
computation on encrypted data.
Recently, Yu et al.[4] proved that, when the perfect security is required,
quantum homomorphic encryption scheme would need at least log2|S| qubits
to store the encrypted result, where |S| denotes the size of the set S (S is the
set of permitted computation). So, the QFHE scheme with perfect security
would necessarily incur exponential storage overhead. The QFHE scheme
proposed in Ref.[5] does not provide the security of cryptographic sense. The
reason is as follow: it only hides n/logn bits (n is the size of the message),
then the ratio of the hidden amount to the total amount approaches to 0
(1/logn → 0) when n approaches to infinity. Broadbent and Jeffery [6]
proposed three public-key quantum homomorphic encryption schemes (not
fully homomorphic), which are constructed by combining quantum one-time
pad with classical FHE scheme. So, their efficiency and security are bounded
by classical FHE scheme.
In modern cryptography, error-correcting code is an important tool in the
design of cryptosystems, such as McEliece public-key encryption algorithm
[7]. As a special lattice, error-correcting codes can also be used to construct
FHE scheme. Similarly, in quantum cryptography, quantum error-correcting
codes can be used to devise quantum cryptosystems, such as quantum au-
thentication scheme [8] and Fujita’s public-key encryption scheme [9]. In
addition, we also have proposed a quantum McEliece public-key encryption
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scheme [10–12] based on error-correcting codes. In this article, we shall devise
a QFHE scheme based on quantum fault-tolerant construction.
2. Quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme
2.1. Symmetric scheme
CSS code is an important kinds of quantum error-correcting codes, and
plays the fundamental role in fault-tolerant quantum computation. We devise
QFHE scheme based on CSS codes, for the reason that it has good property in
fault-tolerant quantum computation: after encoding quantum states through
CSS codes, the quantum operation on logical qubit can be implemented by
transversal quantum operations on physical qubits. For example, the fault-
tolerant H gate and CNOT gate can be implemented by transversal H gates
and transversal CNOT gates, respectively. The fault-tolerant S gate can
be implemented by transversal S−1 gates. Thus, when the code-length is
known, the fault-tolerant H, CNOT, S gates can be carried out without any
information about the code. In fault-tolerant quantum computation, the T
(or pi/8) gate can also be implemented transversally, however, an ancillary
state is necessary, which is relative to the CSS code. See Ref.[13] for more
details.
Firstly, we should determine a value of security parameter n. For a given
value n, there exists 2n− 1 kinds of [[n, 1]] quantum CSS codes. Denote Qn
as the set of all [[n, 1]] quantum CSS codes. The size of Qn is |Qn| = 2n−1.
Next, we present a symmetric QFHE scheme based on the set Qn. The se-
cret key is selected from the set Qn, and is used in the encryption/decryption
algorithms. The scheme contains the following four algorithms.
• Key generation algorithm
Alice randomly selects a CSS code from the set Qn. The CSS code is
used as the secret key. Denote it as sk. We suggest the following two
ways to randomly select the secret key.
1. Similar to the key generation algorithm of Fujita’s public-key en-
cryption scheme [9], Alice selects a CSS code of generator matrix
G from Qn, and randomly selects a nonsingular binary matrix S
and a permutation matrix P (The concrete parameter and form
of these matrixes can be referred in [9]). Then, Alice computes
Gˆ = SGP , which is a generator matrix of another CSS code in
Qn. Gˆ is used as the secret key.
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2. In the other way, it uses a family of CSS codes with parameters
u and v, denoted as {CSSu,v(C1, C2), u, v ∈ {0, 1}n} [13]. Firstly,
Alice determines a CSS code CSS(C1, C2), then randomly selects
two random numbers u and v. The CSS code CSSu,v(C1, C2) is
used as the secret key.
• Encryption algorithm
According to the secret key sk (a CSS code), Alice performs CSS en-
coding on quantum plaintext ρ,
σ = Encsk(ρ), (1)
and each qubit is encoded into n cipher qubits. The quantum circuit for
encoding can be constructed from the standard form of the generator
matrix for a stabilizer code [14].
• Evaluation algorithm
Denote QC as Bob’s quantum computation and QC as its fault-tolerant
version. Bob does not know the secret key, which is the encoding
scheme of CSS code. He performs fault-tolerant quantum computa-
tion QC on encoded quantum data σ, and obtains the encoded result
σ′ = QC(σ), which equals to Encsk(QC(ρ)). The details are as follows.
The set {H, CNOT, T} is a universal set of gates for quantum computa-
tion, so any quantum computation can be described by a quantum
circuit consisting of the H,CNOT,T gates. According to the quantum
circuit, Bob performs quantum computation on encrypted states in the
following ways.
1. If Bob intends to perform an H (or CNOT) gate on the ith (or
i, jth) logical qubits of the plaintext ρ, he should perform a fault-
tolerant H (or CNOT) gate on the corresponding physical qubits
of the encrypted states σ. The fault-tolerant H (or CNOT) has n
transversal H (or CNOT) gates, denoted as H (or CNOT ).
H(Encsk(ρ)) = Encsk(H(ρ)), (2)
CNOT (Encsk(ρ)) = Encsk(CNOT(ρ)). (3)
2. If Bob intends to perform a T gate on the ith logical qubit of the
plaintext ρ, he needs an ancillary state |Θ〉 which depends on the
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secret key (or the CSS code) sk. Because sk is private for Bob,
the ancillary state must be provided by Alice. Alice can produce
the ancillary state by encrypting a qubit (|0〉+ exp(ipi/4)|1〉)/√2:
|Θ〉 = Encsk
( |0〉+ exp(ipi/4)|1〉√
2
)
. (4)
To avoid interactive process between Alice and Bob, the ancillary
state |Θ〉 should be prepared when Alice performs the encryption
algorithm, and be sent to Bob together with the encoded state σ.
According to the implementation of fault-tolerant T gate [13], by
using the ancillary state, the T gate on the logical qubit can also
be implemented by n transversal CNOT gates and n transversal
S−1X gates.
• Decryption algorithm
Denote σ′ as the obtained result after finishing the Evaluation algo-
rithm on the encrypted state σ. According to the secret key sk (a CSS
code), Alice performs CSS decoding on quantum ciphertext σ′
ρ′ = Decsk(σ′), (5)
then every n cipher qubits are decoded into single plain qubit. The
quantum circuit for decoding can be constructed from the standard
form of the generator matrix for a stabilizer code [14].
Until now, we have completely described a symmetric QFHE scheme. Its
correctness (or ρ′ ≡ QC(ρ)) can be deduced from fault-tolerant quantum
computation
QC(Encsk(ρ)) = Encsk(QC(ρ)), (6)
whereQC represents the quantum computation on encoded qubits or physical
qubits, and QC represents the quantum computation on logical qubits.
It is worth to notice that, the ancillary state |Θ〉 depends on the CSS
code, which is Alice’s secret key. Thus, the ancillary state |Θ〉 should be
provided by Alice, and their amount depends on the number of T gates
in Bob’s quantum computation QC. To avoid interactive computing, Alice
should provide enough ancillary states when she sends the encrypted state σ
to Bob.
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Another thing that should be noticed is, our QFHE scheme is constructed
based on quantum fault-tolerant construction, however, it is unnecessary to
periodically perform error-correction precedure.
It can be known from our construction that, the security is independent
of any computational hard problems. Finally, we analyze the security of the
QFHE scheme.
Alice’s secret key sk is a quantum CSS code in Qn, the attacker does not
know which CSS code is selected by Alice. There may be two possible ways
to attack the scheme: (1)Decrypt the cipher state through CSS decoding,
(2)Decrypt the ancillary state |Θ〉 through CSS decoding. In the first case,
the attacker knows neither the plain state nor the CSS code sk. Thus, even
if he guesses the secret key sk correctly, he cannot judge whether he has at-
tacked successfully. In the second case, the attacker can decode the ancillary
state, and compare the decoded state with (|0〉 + exp(ipi/4)|1〉)/√2, then
he can know whether he succeed. So, the focus of the security is the total
amount of [[n, 1]] quantum CSS codes. Because the total number of [[n, 1]]
quantum CSS codes is 2n−1, when n is large enough, the attack will succeed
with an exponentially small probability. Because the ancillary state contains
some information about the CSS code sk, the attacker can determine sk from
sufficiently more ancillary states. In the practice, Alice should predict how
many T gates would be in the quantum circuit QC, and select a large enough
security parameter n. Then the attacker cannot obtain enough information
about sk by measuring these ancillary states.
The theoretical analysis of the security about the QFHE scheme will be
given in the full paper.
2.2. Asymmetric scheme
We have proposed a symmetric QFHE scheme. How to construct an
asymmetric scheme? In this section, we try to solve the problem based on
quantum CSS codes. Similar to Fujita’s public-key cryptosystems [9], random
errors are added to the encoded quantum state while encrypting the state.
However, this would cause a problem: when Bob performs nonlocal quantum
computation on the cipher state, the random errors would propagate between
different logical qubits (a logical qubit is a block of physical qubits). The
errors in single logical qubit maybe increase and finally cause the failure
of decryption. Similar to the periodically error-correction in fault-tolerant
quantum computation, we can solve the problem by periodical interaction:
when Bob finishes a period of quantum computation on encrypted data, he
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sends the outcome to Alice; Alice decrypts it and encrypts it again, then she
sends the new cipher state to Bob; Bob begins the next period of quantum
computation.
• Key generation algorithm
Alice determines the private key (S,G, P ) (It is the same as Ref.[9]),
and computes Gˆ = SGP . Gˆ can determine a CSS code. The CSS
code can correct up to t errors. Then the public key is (Gˆ, ct), where
c ∈ (0, 1) is a constant number.
• Encryption algorithm
According to the public key Gˆ, Alice encodes the quantum plaintext
ρ, and randomly adds ct Pauli errors (denoted as Pct) on the encoded
state,
ρ′ = Pct(EncodeGˆ(ρ)). (7)
Then she sends the cipher state ρ′ to Bob.
• Evaluation algorithm
Assume Bob’s quantum computation has been represented as a quan-
tum circuit QC consisting of H, T, CNOT gates. After receiving the
cipher state ρ′ from Alice, Bob begins to perform the quantum gates
in his circuit according to the public key Gˆ. For the different gates, he
performs in the following different ways.
1. For the H gate, Bob performs the fault-tolerant Hadamard gate
H according to the CSS code Gˆ. H is n transversal H gates.
HPct(EncodeGˆ(ρ)) = P
′
ctH(EncodeGˆ(ρ)) = P
′
ct(EncodeGˆ(H(ρ))),
(8)
where P ′ct denotes another ct Pauli errors. The positions of the ct
Pauli errors are the same as Pct.
2. For the T gate, Bob prepares an ancillary state |Θ〉 according to
the CSS code Gˆ. Then he performs the fault-tolerant T gate.
3. For the CNOT gate, when Bob performs a fault-tolerant CNOT
gate, the Pauli errors will increase. When the total errors increase
to t, Bob returns the outcome to Alice. According to the private
key (S,G, P ), Alice decrypts it. Then she encrypts it again, and
sends to Bob. Bob continues the unfinished quantum computa-
tion.
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Performing the above interactive procedure until Bob finishes the whole
quantum circuit.
• Decryption algorithm
According to the private key (S,G, P ), Alice can decrypt the cipher
state. See Ref.[9] for the details.
This asymmetric scheme is computationally secure. Its formal description
and strict security analysis will be given in the full paper.
3. Discussions
In the asymmetric QFHE scheme, random Pauli errors are introduced to
realize the encryption, and the interaction between Alice and Bob is intro-
duced to control the increase of the errors. To avoid the interactive process,
one possible solution is the quantum bootstrapping, which is similar to the
bootstrapping in classical FHE. The quantum bootstrapping is still under
consideration now.
The encoder of any quantum CSS code cannot commute with arbitrary
quantum operator. From the fault-tolerant quantum computation, we know
the commutative rules between the H (or CNOT) gate and any CSS encoder
Enccss.
H(Enccss(ρ)) = Enccss(H(ρ)),∀ρ, (9)
CNOT (Enccss(ρ)) = Enccss(CNOT (ρ)),∀ρ. (10)
However, in the universal set {H,CNOT, T}, only the T gate does not satisfy
the above relation. So, an ancillary state is employed for the T gate in the
symmetric scheme. While in the asymmetric scheme, the interactive process
between Alice and Bob is used. We guess that, in the construction of QFHE
scheme, it is necessary that Alice provides ancillary computation for Bob.
4. Conclusions
Based on quantum fault-tolerant construction, this paper presents two
QFHE schemes. In the symmetric scheme, the CSS code is used as the secret
key for encryption and decryption. Quantum fault-tolerant construction is
adopted during the computing on encrypted states, however there has not
any periodical error-correction and no interaction is needed. The security of
8
the scheme does not depend on any computational hard problems. In the
asymmetric scheme, interaction between Alice and Bob is necessary, and the
security relies on NP-complete problem.
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